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Introduction
 The origins of the recent financial crisis 
in Portugal were a combination of strong 
macroeconomic imbalances, unsustainable 
public finances, and high public and private 
debt levels. In April 2011, as a result of the crisis 
and amid soaring borrowing costs, Portugal was 
forced to follow Greece and Ireland in requesting 
external financial support. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union 
(EU) ultimately approved a €78 billion ($116 
billion) bailout package in May 2011.
 Along with the bailout, Portugal agreed 
to an economic adjustment program, which 
required it to adopt austerity measures (i.e., fiscal 
consolidation through spending cuts and revenue 
increases) and implement various structural 
reforms (i.e., longer-term changes targeting 
aspects of the economy’s operations, such as state-
owned enterprises, financial sector regulation, 
and labor market rules and regulations). The 
program, however, was controversial and painful 
for large fractions of the population, raising the 
important question, “Why austerity?” Whereas 
countries such as the United States introduced 
easy monetary and fiscal policies to stimulate 
their economies following the crisis, the 
adjustment program may have been necessary 
in Portugal in order to regain credibility and 
regain access to international capital markets in 
the short term and, more importantly, to bring 
about much-needed structural reform, which 
will benefit the country in the long term.
 This article begins with a brief discussion 
of the origins of the financial crisis in Portugal 
and the government’s potential response options. 
It provides an overview of Portugal’s economic 
adjustment program and considers the program’s 
short-term impacts. After an analysis of the 
program’s benefits—namely, that it allowed the 
country to maintain its international reputation 
and undertake significant reforms—the article 
concludes by discussing the need for Portugal 
to continue its reform efforts in a post-crisis 
environment.
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
IN PORTUGAL:
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Origins of the Financial Crisis in 
Portugal
 I begin with a discussion of the financial 
crisis in Portugal.1 In the late 1990s, Portugal’s 
commitment to join the Eurozone, a monetary 
union of EU member states that have adopted 
the euro, led to historically low interest rates, 
with real rates approaching zero percent. 
Easy credit resulted in a decrease in private 
savings and increases in both consumption and 
investment, which, coupled with expansionary 
discretionary fiscal policy, led to strong 
economic growth and low unemployment. 
Importantly, increased spending was 
mostly directed at current expenditure, and 
investment was concentrated in non-tradable 
(i.e., domestically supplied) uncompetitive 
sectors, such as telecommunications, 
electricity, and healthcare (Gaspar, p. 2). The 
result was a “political economic equilibrium 
which was certainly stable for a while,” but that 
allowed for prices in excess of market prices in 
non-tradable sectors and was not conducive 
to innovation, productivity, and sustainable 
employment creation (Gaspar, p. 2).
 As nominal wage growth outpaced labor 
productivity growth and competitiveness 
shrank, Portugal’s current account deficits 
became increasingly larger. At the same time, 
the economy was also under pressure through 
increased competition from Central and 
Eastern European countries and emerging 
markets, especially in its two main export 
industries, footwear and textiles. In the early 
2000s, Portugal continued to experience a 
current account deficit, this time, however, 
accompanied by a steady increase in the 
unemployment rate.
 Economic growth stalled beginning in 
2001 due to a combination of a sharp decline 
in private domestic demand (which had driven 
the recent economic boom), globalization and 
increased competition, and a weak business 
environment. Portugal then began to adjust, 
albeit slowly, to having joined the Eurozone. 
Portugal underwent two phases of budget 
moderation/consolidation, in 2002–2004 
and 2006–2008, and introduced structural 
reforms related to increasing the sustainability 
of public spending, notably social security 
reform and public administration reform 
(Lourtie, pp. 65–66). Portugal also began to 
regain competitiveness, through both salary 
disinflation (i.e., a decrease in the rate of 
wage growth) and higher productivity growth, 
and it implemented important structural 
reforms in areas such as education, research 
and development, energy dependency, public 
administration, and the labor market (Lourtie, 
pp. 58–64). However, Portugal’s labor market 
remained relatively rigid—as exhibited by 
factors such as high employment protection, 
strong government influence on wages, and 
generous unemployment benefits—which 
threatened unemployment, competitiveness, 
and growth.
 Overall, while average export growth 
between 2006 and 2010 outpaced the EU-
15 average, the increase in exports was more 
than offset by higher energy prices and a 
deteriorating income account (Lourtie, pp. 69, 
72). Thus, current account deficits remained 
high (Lourtie, p. 72). Additionally, unlike the 
other peripheral countries (i.e., Greece, Ireland, 
and Spain), Portugal entered the crisis after a 
decade of anemic growth, growing at an annual 
rate of just one percent between 1999 and 2010 
(Lourtie, p. 56). In 2009, the depressed economy 
resulted in declining government revenues. At 
the same time, public spending increased, in 
part to comply with the EU’s Investment and 
Employment Initiative (Lourtie, pp. 67–68). As 
a result, Portugal’s government budget deficit 
soared from 2.7 percent of GDP in 2008 to 9.3 
percent of GDP in 2009 (Lourtie, p. 67). As 
Vítor Gaspar, Portugal’s then Finance Minister, 
noted during a March 2012 presentation at the 
Peterson Institute for International Economics 
in Washington, D.C., “The trigger for the crisis 
in Portugal was the decision by the Portuguese 
government in 2008 to expand the budget quite 
aggressively in response to the global crisis” 
(Gaspar, pp. 2–3).
 Despite indications that Portugal 
would politically be able to undergo fiscal 
consolidation over the following years, markets 
were not convinced (Lourtie, p. 86). Secondary 
market bond yields for Portugal’s sovereign 
 1For a thorough analysis of the financial crisis 
in Portugal, see the articles by Blanchard, Gaspar, and 
Lourtie.
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debt did not improve. It soon became clear 
that progress at the national level could be 
overpowered by a deteriorating environment 
at the European level (Lourtie, p. 78). A 
vicious cycle of contagious negative shocks 
spread throughout Europe. The result was a 
growing consensus that a Portuguese bailout 
was inevitable. On top of Portugal’s economic 
vulnerabilities and its conservative approach, 
the interest rates on Portugal’s sovereign debt 
continued to increase. The final blow was in 
late March and early April of 2011, when Fitch 
lowered Portugal’s rating from A+ to BBB– and 
Standard and Poor’s from A– to BBB– (Lourtie, 
p. 86). Yields soared and borrowing became 
unsustainably expensive. Portugal was forced 
to request assistance from the international 
lenders of last resort just a few days later.
 In short, prior to the global crisis, Portugal 
had sustainable debt levels but faced soaring 
government budget deficits and expectations 
for continued slow growth (Contessi, p. 209). 
Portugal’s economy was in a vulnerable 
state. Its path of slow adjustment to the new 
monetary regime ceased to be an option once 
the crisis hit and the risk of contagion increased 
the cost of Portugal’s sovereign debt (Lourtie, 
p. 74). Under pressure from the European 
Central Bank, Portugal requested financial 
assistance through an IMF-EU program on 
April 5, 2011. The organizations ultimately 
approved a €78 billion ($116 billion) bailout 
package on May 16, 2011. Each disbursement 
of the bailout was dependent on the outcome 
of quarterly evaluations of Portugal’s progress 
in implementing the economic adjustment 
program imposed in conjunction with the 
bailout. As part of the program, Portugal was 
required to adopt austerity measures and 
implement various structural reforms in order 
to reduce the government budget deficit and 
promote economic growth.
Portugal’s Potential Response 
Options to the Financial Crisis
 Portugal’s unique situation was one 
in which it was forced to tackle anemic 
growth and high unemployment while also 
combatting low competitiveness and trade 
imbalances (Blanchard, p. 9). One potential 
response option is expansionary fiscal policy, 
which can help close a recessionary gap by 
increasing aggregate demand and reducing 
unemployment. Specifically, the government 
can increase government spending through 
both government purchases and transfer 
payments. Additionally, the government 
can cut taxes, thereby increasing disposable 
income and stimulating consumption. 
However, in the years leading up to the crisis, 
expansionary fiscal policy was difficult because 
of Portugal’s high sovereign debt levels. That 
aside, as Olivier Blanchard notes, the increase 
in growth and reduction in unemployment 
would have limited the improvement in 
competitiveness and current account deficits, 
ruling out expansionary fiscal policy—at least 
on its own—as an option (Blanchard, p. 9).
 On the other hand, perhaps a stronger 
adjustment (i.e., more contractionary fiscal 
policy) was warranted to keep Portugal’s 
current account deficits in line. However, as 
Pedro Lourtie, Portugal’s former Secretary of 
State for European Affairs, suggests, a stronger 
adjustment would have resulted in a recession 
and, as such, would have been politically 
challenging, especially in the context of 
growth in comparable economies (pp. 73–74). 
Additionally, as with expansionary fiscal policy, 
a stronger adjustment, at least by itself, would 
not have produced a strong improvement in 
Portuguese competitiveness. As Blanchard 
notes, contractionary fiscal policy can spur 
growth because it permits expansionary 
monetary policy (i.e., a reduction in nominal 
interest rates), over which Portugal, having 
joined the Eurozone, no longer had control 
(p. 9).
 On that note, central banks use monetary 
policy to influence the money supply and meet 
objectives such as inflation, employment, and 
economic growth. Countries can spur economic 
growth by increasing the money supply 
and lowering interest rates. Alternatively, 
Portugal could have employed contractionary 
monetary policy to instigate a reduction in 
nominal wages. As part of a stronger downward 
adjustment of domestic demand, currency 
devaluation could have helped Portugal 
improve its competitiveness and reduce its 
trade imbalances. Again, however, neither 
expansionary nor contractionary monetary 
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policy was a plausible option once Portugal 
had joined the Eurozone. The single monetary 
policy is adjusted based on the environment 
in the wider euro area, which poses an issue 
when the economies that make up the union 
are not in the same part of the business cycle. 
In fact, as Lourtie notes, the 2006–2010 period, 
in which current account deficits continued 
to expand despite Portugal’s strong export 
growth, demonstrates the difficulties inherent 
in correcting current account imbalances 
under a monetary union (p. 88).
Overview of Portugal’s Economic 
Adjustment Program
 Lacking monetary policy options, then, 
the three focal points of Portugal’s economic 
adjustment program, crafted alongside the 
IMF and the EU and signed in May 2011, 
were fiscal consolidation, financial stability, 
and structural transformation (European 
Commission – Directorate-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs, 2014, p. 3). 
At the same time as pursuing these objectives, 
the program aimed to mitigate the negative 
social impacts of the adjustment process 
(European Commission… Affairs, 2014, p. 3). 
In terms of the first pillar, the program initially 
targeted improving Portugal’s government 
budget deficit from 9.1 percent in 2010 to 5.9 
percent in 2011, 4.5 percent in 2012, and 3.0 
percent in 2013 (European Commission…
Affairs, 2011, pp. 13, 18; “Factbox: Terms of EU/
IMF…”). The program’s measures represented 
a cumulative fiscal consolidation of roughly 
ten percent of GDP between 2011 and 2013 
(European Commission…Affairs, 2011, p. 18). 
Although the actual 2011 government budget 
deficit of roughly 4.2 percent was better than 
the program’s target, it was achieved primarily 
through a one-time transfer from bank pension 
funds to the state of about 3.5 percent of GDP, 
without which the target would have been 
missed (Gaspar, p. 4). That being said, however, 
Portugal’s reduction in its 2011 cyclically 
adjusted budget deficit of four percentage 
points of GDP still stands out in context; it was 
approximately three times that of the average 
of the euro area (Gaspar, p. 4).
 According to the terms of the program, 
the fiscal consolidation would rely primarily 
on spending cuts (approximately two-thirds 
of the adjustment) (European Commission…
Affairs, 2011, p. 18). Specific measures on 
the expenditure side included improving 
public sector efficiency, reducing government 
headcount by at least one percent a year, 
cutting government wages, curtailing health 
care and education costs, and minimizing 
social transfers such as unemployment benefits 
(European Commission…, 2011, pp. 19–20, 
47; “Factbox…”). On the other hand, revenue-
raising measures primarily consisted of raising 
value-added tax rates, revising the list of goods 
taxed at lower rates, broadening the property 
tax and income tax bases, selling state-owned 
assets (i.e., privatization), and raising fees for 
healthcare services (European Commission…
Affairs, 2011, pp. 19–20; “Factbox…”).
 The program supported fiscal 
consolidation through various fiscal-structural 
reforms targeting inefficiencies associated with 
government spending and revenue collection. 
For example, the program aimed to bring 
the public financial management system 
up to par with international best practices 
(European Commission…Affairs, 2014, p. 33). 
Program goals also included streamlining 
public sector services by consolidating and 
simplifying administrative policies (European 
Commission…Affairs, 2011, p. 21). On the 
revenue side, measures included improving the 
effectiveness of tax administration (European 
Commission…Affairs, 2011, p. 21). The 
program broadly addressed the public sector 
with a privatization plan, intended not only 
to generate revenues but also to rebalance 
the economy toward the tradable sector by 
increasing competition in the non-tradable 
sector (European Commission…Affairs, 2011, 
p. 22). It also aimed to contain the risks and 
costs associated with state-owned enterprises, 
such as their lack of efficiency relative to the 
private sector, and public-private partnerships, 
which had allowed Portugal to finance 
various public infrastructure projects, albeit 
by sacrificing future government revenues, 
thus only postponing rather than avoiding 
the associated budget constraints (European 
Commission…Affairs, 2011, pp. 20–21).
 In regard to Portugal’s financial sector, 
absent either a property bubble (as in Ireland and 
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Spain) or significant holdings of toxic assets, the 
sector entered the financial crisis and subsequent 
economic adjustment program relatively intact, 
albeit highly levered (European Commission…
Affairs, 2011, p. 22). The program’s financial 
sector strategy was aimed at reducing leverage and 
strengthening regulatory supervision (European 
Commission…Affairs, 2011, p. 22). Another goal 
was to ensure sufficient capitalization, both to 
combat the existing environment and to improve 
perceptions of the banking system’s solvency 
(European Commission…Affairs, 2011, p. 22). As 
such, the Banco de Portugal, Portugal’s central 
bank, mandated Core Tier 1 capital ratio2 targets 
of nine percent by the end of 2011 and ten percent 
by the end of 2012 (European Commission…
Affairs, 2011, p. 22).
 Although notable progress was made 
in these areas—with the average Core Tier 
1 capital ratio improving from 8.5 percent 
in May 2011 to 12.3 percent at the end of 
2013 and the aggregate loan-to-deposit ratio 
falling from 160 percent to 117 percent over 
the same time period—the resilience of the 
banking system was thrown into question 
soon after the program concluded in May 2014 
(European Commission…Affairs, 2014, p. 49). 
Banco Espírito Santo SA, formerly one of the 
largest Portuguese banks, collapsed in August 
2014, shortly after reporting its quarterly 
performance (see the article by Sloan in this 
volume of Perspectives; Kowsmann). It had 
suffered significant losses in the first half of 
the year due to accounting irregularities at its 
parent, Espírito Santo International SA, which 
had filed for bankruptcy protection on July 
18, 2014 (Kowsmann). The Banco de Portugal 
subsequently announced a rescue plan for 
Banco Espírito Santo. It would be split into 
a “good bank,” to be recapitalized with €4.9 
billion ($6.6 billion) from the government, and 
a “bad bank” (Kowsmann). Nevertheless, the 
bank’s trouble and bailout led to fears about the 
stability of the rest of the Portuguese banking 
system, the ability of regulators to monitor 
it, and the potential lack of additional funds 
available to the government for providing aid 
to banks (European Commission…Affairs, 
2014, p. 49; Kowsmann).
 The third focal point, a critical 
component of Portugal’s economic adjustment 
program, was ambitious structural reform. It 
aimed to boost the country’s long-term growth 
by reforming labor and product markets 
and by improving the business environment 
(European Commission…Affairs, 2011, p. 23). 
Goals of the labor market reform included 
creating jobs and increasing labor market 
flexibility through measures such as easing 
employee protection, reducing compensation 
for overtime work, and increasing incentives 
to work by limiting both the amount and 
duration of unemployment benefits (European 
Commission…Affairs, 2011, pp. 24–25). The 
primary objective of product market reforms 
was to drive down prices in non-tradable 
sectors closer to market levels, in part by 
reducing barriers to entry in order to increase 
competition (European Commission…Affairs, 
2011, pp. 23, 27).
 To improve the business environment, 
the program focused on reforming the 
inefficient judicial system, increasing 
competition, and easing the regulatory 
burden (European Commission…Affairs, 
2011, pp. 27–28). Specifically, to resolve the 
backlog of cases in courts within two years, 
measures included improving the efficiency 
of courts and strengthening legislation to 
facilitate out-of-court settlements (European 
Commission…Affairs, 2011, pp. 28, 54–55). 
The program planned to increase competition 
through stronger enforcement of competition 
rules and to reduce the administrative and 
regulatory burden on businesses by targeting 
legal formalities such as licensing procedures 
(European Commission…Affairs, 2011, pp. 28, 
87).
Short-Term Impacts of Portugal’s 
Economic Adjustment Program
 In the short term, Portugal experienced 
negative economic and social impacts as a 
result of its economic adjustment program. 
For example, as a result of these measures, 
Portugal experienced a deepened recession, as 
evidenced by record unemployment rates and 
 2The Core Tier 1 capital ratio is used by regulators 
to measure the capital that financial institutions hold 
relative to the risks that they take on. It is the ratio of an 
institution’s core capital (i.e., highest-quality capital) to its 
total risk-weighted assets (i.e., each asset is assigned a risk 
weight given the perceived level of risk associated with it).
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lower nominal wages. At the same time, despite 
the significant fiscal consolidation, Portugal’s 
debt-to-GDP levels continued to rise during 
the program, the result of a deeper-than-
expected economic contraction. Additionally, 
although one of the goals of the program was 
to mitigate its negative social impacts, the 
fact is that healthcare, education, and social 
security budgets were cut at the same time as 
unemployment rates hit record levels and as 
household incomes shrank. As Miguel Glatzer, 
a political scientist at La Salle University in 
Philadelphia, noted, “Social spending has 
been cut at the same time as a spike in social 
need. This has had dramatic consequences for 
vulnerable groups” (quoted in Wise, 2014).
 In terms of healthcare, the increase in 
healthcare fees, by indexing the fees to inflation, 
resulted in fewer patients in 2012 (Dias, p. 3). 
Additionally, the spending cuts imposed by 
austerity reduced funding for social programs 
associated with drug decriminalization, 
including treatment facilities and needle 
exchanges (see the article by Kundrod in 
this volume of Perspectives). Education also 
suffered a 23 percent reduction in spending 
between 2010 and 2012, accompanied by an 
increase in class sizes (Dias, p. 3).
 The collapse in domestic demand—
exacerbated by a dearth of credit and by 
austerity measures such as the increase in 
value-added tax rates—dealt a significant blow 
to small businesses in Portugal. Bankruptcies 
increased by 41 percent in 2012 (Dias, p. 1). 
Small businesses are especially important to the 
Portuguese economy: companies that employ 
fewer than ten employees account for 43 percent 
of private sector jobs compared to 29 percent 
for the EU average (European Commission – 
Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry, 
p. 2). Job cuts in both the private and public 
sectors resulted in the unemployment rate 
soaring to 12.9 percent in 2011, 15.8 percent 
in 2012, and 16.4 percent in 2013, from about 
12.0 percent in 2010 (European Commission 
– Eurostat). In fact, in both 2012 and 2013, 
Portugal’s unemployment rate was the third 
highest in the Eurozone after Greece and Spain 
(European Commission – Eurostat).
 Youth unemployment and long-term 
unemployment were particularly impacted. 
Job seekers left the country, increasing 
net emigration, although at low levels 
on an absolute basis. At the same time, 
unemployment benefits were cut and the 
maximum period over which benefits could 
be claimed was nearly halved to 18 months 
(Wise, 2014). As of 2013, only an estimated 
44 percent of the jobless were receiving 
any unemployment benefits (Wise, 2013). 
Additionally, the number of beneficiaries of 
Portugal’s main guaranteed minimum income 
benefit program, RSI (Rendimento Social de 
Inserção [Social Integration Income]), fell 
by nearly 44 percent between January 2010 
and March 2014 (calculation by author with 
data from OECD, “OECD Economic Surveys: 
Portugal”).
 Ultimately, the package of austerity 
measures—including the increase in taxes, 
reduction in tax benefits and incentives, and 
increase in fees for healthcare services—
caused GDP per capita and disposable incomes 
to shrink tremendously. In fact, as Ricardo Reis 
showed, GDP per capita fell more in Portugal 
between 2000 and 2012 than in the U.S. during 
the Great Depression or in Japan during its lost 
decade (p. 144). Anecdotally, according to João 
Vieira Lopes, head of the CCCP (Confederação 
do Comércio e Serviços de Portugal [Portuguese 
Commerce and Services Confederation]), 
“Four or five years ago, shoplifters were taking 
perfume, bottles of whisky and expensive razor 
blades from supermarkets.…Now they’re 
stealing rice and tins of tuna” (quoted in Wise, 
2013). And, amidst the recession and the 
austerity measures, Portugal experienced some 
of the largest protests since the 1974 Carnation 
Revolution, which marked the end of the 
dictatorship and restoration of democracy 
(Dias, p. 4).
How Austerity Gained Traction
 Given contradictory economic theories—
as well as the negative short-term economic 
and social consequences—it is important to 
consider how austerity measures and structural 
reforms gained policy traction in Portugal in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis. Superficially, it 
is an easy question to answer: Portugal did not 
have a choice. More specifically, in the context 
of the financial crisis, it did not have the option 
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to pursue expansionary fiscal policy: Portugal 
required a bailout, the terms of which involved 
contractionary fiscal policy. In choosing 
between accepting the terms of the bailout and 
defaulting on sovereign debt, the former was 
surely the better option, as discussed later.
 The idea of austerity has been around 
for years, but throughout 2010 support for 
stimulus spending began to falter, whereas 
support for fiscal consolidation began to grow, 
especially as the Greek crisis highlighted the 
potential dangers of deficit spending. On the 
surface, austerity was easy to justify, because 
the concept makes intuitive sense: if you have 
too much debt, you have to stop spending 
(Blyth, p. 7). It also makes sense on a moral 
level: in order to balance the scales, we must 
recompense for the excesses of an economic 
upswing with the repercussions of a downturn 
(Blyth, p. 13; Krugman). Indeed, in October 
2011, newly elected Portuguese Prime Minister 
Pedro Passos Coelho said that Portugal would 
only recover from its situation “by becoming 
poorer” (quoted in Dias, p. 3).
 Research seemed to support austerity as 
well. An oft-cited 2010 article by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2010, p. 573) claimed countries with high 
public debt exhibited stunted economic growth. 
Additionally, Alesina and Ardagna’s 2009 article 
(p. 37) considered the seemingly contradictory 
theory of “expansionary fiscal consolidation,” a 
hypothesis introduced by Giavazzi and Pagano 
in 1990 (Blyth, p. 169). Their research indicated 
that fiscal consolidation could actually result 
in stronger growth and lower unemployment, 
arguing that the contraction could be off-set, 
among other factors, by a potential increase 
in current consumer spending driven by 
consumers’ expectations for long-run increases 
in their disposable incomes because of the fiscal 
adjustment in the current period (Alesina and 
Ardagna, p. 38).
 Once such research had entered the official 
arena, there was no turning back (Krugman). 
In June 2010, the European Central Bank’s 
then President, Jean-Claude Trichet, rejected 
the view that austerity would stifle growth: “In 
fact, in these circumstances, everything that 
helps to increase the confidence of households, 
firms and investors in the sustainability of 
public finances is good for the consolidation 
of growth and job creation. I firmly believe 
that in the current circumstances confidence-
inspiring policies will foster and not hamper 
economic recovery, because confidence is the 
key factor today” (quoted in Krugman).
Benefits of Portugal’s Economic 
Adjustment Program
 Proponents of austerity argue that even 
if there is some pain in the short term, fiscal 
consolidation, especially when accompanied 
by meaningful structural reform, if necessary, 
is a suitable policy because of the long-term 
benefits. As discussed previously, Portugal’s 
IMF-EU bailout was conditioned not only 
on various austerity measures but also on 
the implementation of an ambitious reform 
agenda. On one hand, rather than accepting 
the bailout, Portugal did have the option to 
default on its sovereign debt, which would 
have created tremendous instability. On the 
other hand, the two major long-term benefits 
of the economic adjustment program are 
that it allowed the country to maintain its 
international reputation and to undertake 
significant reforms.
 International reputation is important to 
ensure continued access to capital markets, of 
course, because investors burned by a country 
will be less likely to purchase that country’s 
bonds in the future. Russia, for example, 
endured no access to the debt markets for 69 
years following its refusal to repay Tsarist debts 
in 1918 (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, p. 61). That 
being said, a country’s reputation is important 
for more than just repeat borrowing. As Reinhart 
and Rogoff note, a potential sovereign defaulter 
must also consider the negative impacts on 
trade associated with revamping trade routes 
and financing decisions to circumvent creditors, 
especially in today’s global economy (Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2009, p. 57). Finally, default can 
have a harmful impact on broader inter-
national relations, including national security 
arrangements and foreign direct investment, 
reducing not only investment itself but also the 
associated knowledge transfer (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2009, p. 58).
 In addition to avoiding the reputational 
costs of defaulting, Portugal reaped the benefits, 
reputational and otherwise, of accepting the 
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bailout and economic adjustment program. 
By adopting the program, Portugal began the 
process of regaining its credibility. As evidence, 
Portugal’s 10-year bond yields were as low as 
approximately 3.4 percent around the time 
of its exit from the program in May 2014, a 
significant decline from approximately 9.8 
percent around the time of Portugal’s bailout 
request and a record of 18.3 percent at the 
depth of its crisis in January 2012 (Lima, 
2011; Lima, 2014; Lima and Nelson). Adopting 
the program made it clear that Portugal was 
committed to the painful changes necessary 
to achieve sustainable economic growth. As 
discussed previously, quarterly reviews by the 
international lenders monitored progress made 
on implementing the program. The results of 
each quarterly review were made public, which 
Portugal’s former Finance Minister, Gaspar, 
suggests allowed the country to present its 
progress in an official, transparent manner 
(Gaspar, p. 3).
 Beyond its importance for international 
reputation, Portugal’s undertaking structural 
reform under the program stands out for 
two reasons. First, the bailout insulated 
Portugal from the vagaries of international 
capital markets, allowing the country time 
to address its macroeconomic imbalances 
(Gaspar, p. 3). Much like a private company 
is relatively sheltered from the market 
pressures and additional scrutiny that publicly 
traded companies face, Portugal was able to 
focus on meaningful reforms rather than 
pandering to the financial markets, which are 
often interested in short-term outcomes. As 
described previously, Portugal was forced to 
request the bailout when it became illiquid as 
a result of markets demanding Portugal pay 
much higher interest rates on its debt during 
the global financial crisis to compensate for 
its higher perceived risks compared to, say, 
Germany. In other words, Portugal, arguably, 
was solvent and would have been able to tackle 
its debt load were it not for the vagaries of the 
capital markets that lost faith in its ability to 
pay (Cline, pp. 207, 228). Indeed, once reforms 
were in place (or at least in progress), Portugal 
successfully returned to the long-term debt 
market with syndicated sales of 5-year bonds 
in January 2013 and 10-year bonds in May 
2013, followed in April 2014 by its first auction 
since its bailout, issuing €750 million ($1.04 
billion) of 10-year bonds at an average yield of 
3.575 percent (Lima and Nelson; Ruffoni and 
Kowsmann; Wise et al.). This was the lowest 
rate Portugal had ever received for its 10-year 
debt (Minder).
 Second, the economic adjustment 
program, as a condition of the bailout, 
made adopting significant structural reform 
politically feasible. As discussed previously, in 
the decade prior to the crisis, Portugal began to 
tackle its economic vulnerabilities only through 
a slow adjustment (Lourtie, p. 68). Among 
other reasons, the political difficulty associated 
with a stronger adjustment helps rationalize 
such an approach, as the fiscal consolidation 
measures and reforms most likely to support 
an economic recovery are often unpopular 
(Lourtie, p. 74). Coincidentally in this situation, 
on March 23, 2011, the Portuguese Parliament 
rejected an austerity package proposed by 
the government, and the country headed 
for early elections (Lourtie, p. 86). Elections 
were held on June 5, 2011, shortly after the 
agreement with the IMF and the EU had 
been brokered by the caretaker government 
(Lourtie, pp. 87, 89). Interestingly, the three-
year fiscal consolidation plans presented by the 
Portuguese government in March 2011 were 
consistent with those eventually imposed by the 
agreement (European Commission…Affairs, 
2011, p. 18). Assuming that international 
lenders such as the IMF and the EU will punish 
noncompliance, perhaps by withholding 
subsequent installments of a bailout package, 
governments can use such a threat to help pass 
unpopular, but necessary, policies (Vreeland, 
p. 8). On a similar note, internal political issues 
might make it difficult for a country, like 
Germany, that is important to the resolution 
of the crisis, to gain support domestically 
for providing assistance. Emphasizing the 
pain and effort that Portugal would be going 
through during the adjustment program could 
help in such a situation.
 Looking beyond the negative short-term 
economic and social impacts of the program, 
in the long run, the structural reforms will 
have a significant impact on improving 
Portugal’s competitiveness, macroeconomic 
125
imbalances, and, ultimately, economic growth. 
According to Bouis and Duval, at the time of 
the program a range of reforms in labor and 
product markets, as well as in benefit, tax, 
and retirement systems, could have resulted 
in a potential increase in GDP per capita of 
more than 5 percent over a five-year horizon 
and approximately 13 percent over a ten-year 
horizon (Gaspar, p. 31). Research from Sandra 
Gomes and colleagues shows similar results 
(cited in Gaspar, p. 31). Therefore, the positive 
impact of the economic adjustment program 
stems not only from a gradual improvement 
in market perceptions but also from the real, 
significant benefits of eliminating structural 
barriers that led Portugal to the financial 
crisis, including its rigid labor market and 
weak business environment.
Conclusion and Looking Forward
 Portugal followed the tenets of the 
economic adjustment program assiduously 
and made significant reform efforts, emerging 
as one of the OECD’s top reformers during 
2012 and 2013, given its responsiveness to 
the organization’s reform recommendations 
(OECD, “Portugal: Deepening Structural 
Reform…,” p. 12). Moreover, Portugal regained 
partial access to international capital markets 
in January 2013 and made a clean exit (i.e., 
without a precautionary credit line) from the 
program in May 2014 (Minder; Wise et al.). 
Nevertheless, the subsequent bailout within 
the banking sector in 2014 has hampered 
progress. Additionally, Gaspar, in March 2013, 
noted that work to reduce sovereign debt levels 
would not be finished even upon successful 
completion of the program; rather, it would 
demand “the efforts of a generation” (quoted 
in Dias, p. 4). Therefore, it is important to 
sustain reforms going forward, especially in a 
post-crisis environment, to fully achieve the 
estimated potential benefit to GDP growth.
 Specifically, Portugal should continue 
reducing labor market rigidity and segmentation 
by further reforming employment protection and 
wage bargaining, reviewing the unemployment 
benefit system, furthering active labor market 
policies to keep workers involved and to develop 
their skills, and broadly working to reduce 
the skills mismatch within the workforce 
(OECD, “Economic Policy Reforms: Going…,” 
pp. 268–69; OECD, “Portugal: Deepening 
Structural Reform…,” pp. 23–26, 29). Within 
product market regulation, Portugal should 
work toward improving competition and still-
above-market prices within the energy sector, 
strengthening competition in professional 
services by minimizing the barriers to 
entry and limiting the market-stifling role 
of professional associations, and reducing 
regulatory restrictions on competition within 
transport sectors (OECD, “Economic Policy 
Reforms: Going…,” p. 269; OECD, “Portugal: 
Deepening Structural Reform…,” pp. 16–18). 
In regard to improving the business envir-
onment, Portugal should consider further 
reducing administrative burdens, especially 
for small businesses, and strengthening the 
enforcement of its competition policy (OECD, 
“Portugal: Deepening Structural Reform…,” 
pp. 18–19). At the same time, Portugal 
should promote innovation by providing 
access to appropriate funding and improving 
commercialization prospects for academic 
research (OECD, “Economic Policy Reforms: 
Going…,” p. 269; OECD, “Portugal: Deepening 
Structural Reform…,” pp. 31–32).
 In addition to sustaining reforms within 
Portugal, it will be increasingly important to 
focus on preventative measures, especially 
through enhanced cooperation among EU 
countries. Although Portugal’s economy 
was struggling long before the crisis, it is 
important to remain cognizant of the impact of 
cross-border contagion in Portugal’s crisis. As 
Lourtie notes, “One of the lessons from the…
crisis is that Portugal’s fate is not dependent on 
its decisions alone” (p. 90). Despite relatively 
stable fundamentals, a general increase in risk 
aversion in global financial markets, coupled 
with Portugal’s slow growth and increasing 
sovereign debt, led the previously sustainable 
to be seen as unsustainable (Blyth, p. 71; 
Contessi, pp. 209, 216–17). Therefore, broad 
structural reform within the EU as a whole 
will ultimately be essential to both prevent and 
mitigate financial crises going forward.
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